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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last decade, a succession of high-profile corporate scandals and bankruptcies 
(Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat, Lehman Brothers, AIG, etc.) has put the control of public 
companies’ executive management firmly in the spotlight. From this point of view, 
information disclosure is usually regarded as the cornerstone of an effective institutional 
design, especially when (minority) shareholders are remote from the company and its 
business model (Berle and Means 1932). 
 
Yet, as regulators and academics have long recognized, relevant and reliable 
information disclosure depends crucially on corporate governance (Brown 2007): who 
is accountable for the production and certification of financial and non-financial 
reporting? Any attempt to answer this question necessarily involves getting inside the 
black box of public companies in order to investigate the set of relationships that exist 
between a firm’s various constituencies (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright 2004). 
Invariably, any such analysis points to the responsibility of the Board of directors, 
which acts as strategic counsellor, facilitator of network relations and monitor of 
business affairs (see e.g. Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand 1996). This latter role notably 
includes hiring and firing the chief executive officer (CEO) and other executive 
managers, determining executive pay and supervising the firm’s reporting and 
disclosure procedures. The Board achieves this last objective by recommending the 
external auditor to shareholders and by interfacing with the external auditors, the 
internal auditors and management. In addition, in almost all jurisdictions, the Board 
should certify financial statements and other public information1. In this way, it helps 
                                                 
1
 In the U.S. case, existing signature requirements for reports filed under the 1934 Exchange Act and the 
2002 Sarbanes Oxley Act demand that at least a majority of directors sign annual reports, taking specific 
responsibility for them even beyond formal compliance with accounting standards. The importance of the 
Board in shaping the overall quality of public company reporting is regularly reaffirmed by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (Brown 2007), whose primary function is to ensure adequate disclosure. A 
conspicuous example is provided by the W. R. Grace Report (1997) – a section 21(a) Report – that notes: 
‘the Commission considers it essential for board members to move aggressively to fulfil their 
responsibilities to oversee the conduct and performance of management and to ensure that the company’s 
public statements are candid and complete’. In the British case, the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance (2003) – listing rules require public companies to report on how they apply the principles set 
out in the Code or to provide an explanation – clearly states: ‘Non-executive directors should scrutinise 
the performance of management in meeting agreed goals and objectives and monitor the reporting of 
performance. They should satisfy themselves on the integrity of financial information and that financial 
controls and systems of risk management are robust and defensible’ (p.5). In the French case, legal duties 
for directors are set out in the Code de commerce: article L.232 indicates that in listed companies the 
Board must certify the financial statements. 
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alleviate the agency problem by facilitating the regular release of unbiased accounting 
information by managers to those who hold a stake in the firm (including shareholders), 
thus reducing the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. 
 
The crucial question, then, is the following: what characteristics of the Board are likely 
to improve its performance in this certification role? The ‘conventional wisdom’ 
(Bhagat and Black 1999), both among regulators and corporate governance scholars, is 
that director ‘independence’ is the essential attribute. As Cunningham (2007) notes, the 
now standard response to corporate crises is to look to independent directors to provide 
greater transparency, with independence being defined or proxied through a set of 
formal criteria (de jure or formal independence). The Sarbanes Oxley Act, passed in 
2002, is no exception, requiring that audit committees be comprised solely of 
independent members. The objective is clear: de jure independence should help to limit 
conflicts of interests, thus improving the performance of directors in their monitoring 
activity. In the case of certification, independence guarantees that the decision not to 
validate biased information is made without collusion or delay. 
 
Some recent developments suggest that this ‘conventional wisdom’ is gradually being 
challenged, with expertise being increasingly recognized as a decisive attribute, 
especially for the audit committee (Cunningham 2007). In particular, the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act introduced a path-breaking provision that requires that all audit committee 
members be financially literate and that at least one person be a financial expert (section 
407)2. The idea is intuitive: generic expertise in accounting and finance, acquired 
through education or professional activity, potentially increases the relevance and 
reliability of disclosure and improves the quality of financial and non-financial 
reporting that the Board must certify.  
 
However, we argue that for certain types of business models, effective, trustworthy 
certification requires firm-specific in addition to generic expertise. This will be the case 
whenever intangible resources, related to innovation, knowledge and human resources, 
are significant drivers of the firm’s performance potential. The main reason is that these 
intangible resources, by their very nature, raise serious problems of valuation 
                                                 
2
 In the UK, the Combined Code (2003; see supra, note 1) also contains a recommendation of financial 
expertise.  
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(recognition and measurement) for outsiders and often lack efficient market pricing 
(Lev 2001). From an accounting point of view, the dilemma is then the following: either 
these resources should be deliberately ignored, thereby exacerbating informational 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, or specific reporting rules should be applies, 
which requires firm-specific expertise to be efficiently implemented by directors. 
 
The problem is that firm-specific expertise is likely to be negatively related with de jure 
independence, as commonly defined and proxied. This is not the case with generic 
expertise, which can easily be combined with independence. Thus the focus on 
independence may have had, and may still be having, adverse consequences, since it 
reduces the ability of Board members to acquire and certify firm-specific information, 
whether financial or non-financial, in circumstances that are likely to be significant in 
contemporary businesses. To some extent, this analysis sheds some light on a long-
standing empirical puzzle, namely the observation that independence has a negligible or 
even negative effect on company performance (Klein 1998; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and 
Johnson 1998; Bhagat and Black 1999; Klein, Shapiro and Young 2005; Bhagat, Bolton 
and Romano 2008)3. 
 
More precisely, we show that there exists an optimal share of independent directors for 
each company, related to the core characteristics of the firm in question. We derive two 
main implications from this analysis. On the one hand, ‘super-majority’ Boards (that is 
Boards with at least 80% of de jure independent members) appear to be attractive 
devices only in very limited cases – contrary to what is usually called for. As stated by 
Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005), the main contributors to the Higgs Report that led 
to the revision, in November 2003, of the British Combined Code: ‘the advocacy by 
institutional investors, policy advisors and the business media for greater non-executive 
independence may be too crude or even counter-productive’ (p.S19). On the other hand, 
‘grey’ or ‘affiliate’ directors (that is, directors who do not meet the standard criteria of 
independence while not being member of the firm’s executive management) may 
enhance the overall quality of control, including certification.  
 
                                                 
3
 See e.g. Bhagat, Bolton and Romano (2008, p.1850): ‘Board independence, however, is negatively and 
significantly related to contemporaneous, next year’s, and next two years’ operating performance. This 
result is surprising, especially considering the recent emphasis that has been placed on board 
independence by the stock exchanges’ amended listing requirements post-Enron; however, it is consistent 
with prior literature on boards’.  
 5
Our analysis complements and extends Osterloh and Frey’s (2006) argument, who insist 
on the role that may be played by insiders with firm-specific knowledge in responding 
to critical issues of corporate governance. We expressly focus on the monitoring role of 
the Board, and what is undoubtedly at the core of this role, namely the supervision of 
information flows from the firm to outside stakeholders, including investors on the 
(stock) market. By so doing, we connect this corporate governance issue with 
accounting theory and practice. This connection is suggested by Gordon (2007) who 
argues that the growing volume of information disclosed by listed companies makes 
insiders and other firm-specific experts less valuable as corporate directors. On the 
contrary, our analysis stresses the importance of their inside perspective for improving 
the quality of disclosure and control. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The second section examines the 
information set available to shareholders, seeking to make accurate financial decisions 
concerning the firm. The main point here is that the set of business information to be 
disclosed is jointly constituted of market-driven and firm-specific information. The 
latter type of information is likely to be relevant in business models where performance 
is driven mainly by intangible resources. The third section focuses on accounting as the 
main device through which information (both market-driven and firm-specific) is 
transmitted from inside the firm to its external environment. In particular, we argue that 
the certification of financial statements by directors with specific business knowledge 
becomes increasingly important as intangible resources grow in significance. The fourth 
section focuses, therefore, on the Board of directors and in particular on the Board 
characteristics likely to produce efficient certification. The existence of a trade-off 
between two of these characteristics (de jure independence and firm-specific expertise) 
is emphasized, and helps to deliver an optimal share of independent directors, 
depending on the relative importance of intangibles resources in the business model. 
Section five provides a summary of the argument by way of conclusion. 
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II. THE INFORMATIONAL BASIS OF STOCK MARKET INVESTMENT AND 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
 
This section examines the informational basis of financial decision-making in the stock 
market (1.) and relates this basis to the kind of resources (tangible versus intangible) 
involved at the firm level (2.). 
1. Financial investors and the relevant information set 
 
Both standard setters – in particular the US Financial Accounting Standard Board 
(FASB) and the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) that regulates EU- 
listed corporate groups – and a majority of accounting scholars now share the view that 
the primary function of financial reporting is the provision of information to investors. 
This information enables them to assess the amounts, timing and uncertainty of future 
cash flows from their investment in corporate shares or debt securities (SFAC n°1, §37; 
IASB Framework, §15). Under this financial ‘decision usefulness paradigm’ of 
accounting (Hitz, 2007), accounting relevance is defined as the degree of 
correspondence between required and disclosed information. 
 
Basic financial theory provides some clear-cut answers as to the kind of information on 
a firm (as opposed to macroeconomic evidence) required by investors to make accurate 
financial decisions. A first set of assumptions concerns the characteristics of investors. 
Investors are expected to be rational (they maximize the expected utility of lifetime 
consumption) and capable of borrowing or lending without constraints, at a given 
interest rate i. Individual preferences are then irrelevant (consumption and investment 
decisions can be separated) and the sole information required by investors is the ability 
of the firm to deliver future revenue. The ‘fundamental value’ of the firm (FV) can then 
be defined as the discounted value of (expected) net future cash flows to its residual 
claimers: 
FV = Rt
e
(1+ i)tt=1
∞
    (1) 
where Ret is the expected net cash flow at time t, and i the usual discount rate. 
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A second set of assumptions concerns the origin of these (expected) cash flows, that is, 
the type of ‘resources’4 deployed by the production process. In the simplest case, the set 
of resources is composed only of tangible, separable resources. Under these conditions, 
the fundamental value of the firm is expected to be equal to the sum, properly 
discounted, of the net contributions of these resources to the fundamental value of the 
whole firm (see e.g. Brealey and Myers 2005, Ch.9): 
FV = r1,t
e
(1+ i)tt=1
∞
 +
r2,t
e
(1+ i)tt=1
∞
 + ...+
rn,t
e
(1+ i)tt=1
∞
 =
rj,t
e
(1+ i)tt=1
∞

j=1
n
   (2) 
where rej,t is the expected net contribution of resource aj at time t, j = (1, …, n). In this 
way, the firm is merely a collection of n resources and its fundamental value equals the 
sum of the fundamental values of its resources. 
 
A third set of assumptions relates to the existence of an efficient pricing for each of the 
firm’s resources as well as for its shares. Suppose that every resource is traded in a 
competitive, liquid market by rational investors. Then, the equilibrium price (pj) of a 
resource aj equals its fundamental value, so that no mispricing occurs. (Capital) markets 
are then fundamentally ‘efficient’, in the sense that the price of a resource fully and 
correctly incorporates all available information on the ability of this resource to generate 
net revenue through time (Fama 1970; Malkiel 1992). The Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis (ECMH) implies that a firm’s share price (P) is equal to its fundamental 
value5. If all the resources as well as the firm’s shares are traded in (fundamentally) 
efficient markets, then equation (2) becomes: 
FV = P = p j
j=1
n
   (3) 
To sum up, on the basis of this set of hypotheses concerning investors, the economic 
nature of the firm and the functioning of markets, a firm’s (fundamental) value (FV) can 
be derived from the market value (pj) of all its resources (aj). This list of prices 
constitutes the whole set of information on the company required by financial market 
                                                 
4
 We prefer not to use the term assets because of its special accounting meaning: an asset is a resource 
that is recognised on the left-hand side of the balance sheet. 
5
 Note that this identification of fundamental and market values for a share is a typical result (and not just 
an hypothesis) of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the standard model of equilibrium asset 
pricing, where all investors share homogenous beliefs concerning the joint distribution of (future) payoffs 
on the share (Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965). 
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investors in order to value a firm properly, that is, to assess the structure of its future 
cash flows.  
 
This conceptual framework clearly relies on restrictive assumptions and may be 
questioned from at least two different viewpoints. Let  define the set (or vector) of 
information available to investors to assess a firm’s fundamental value. The first 
critique refers to the efficiency of the stock market with respect to the treatment of the 
information set , i.e. to the dynamics of share price formation. Some investors may 
not be fully rational, as recognised by behavioural finance and cognitive psychology 
(Shleifer 2000): either their preferences depart from the expected utility framework or 
their beliefs are subject to overconfidence, conservatism or irrational exuberance. Even 
assuming the coexistence of rational and non-rational investors, limits to arbitrage (e.g. 
constraints on short-selling) may prevent an alignment of fundamental and market 
values (Barberis and Thaler 2003)6. In sum, and whatever the reasons, some may 
question the ability of the market to provide efficient pricing, in the sense of the ECMH: 
market prices may not efficiently ‘exploit’ the relevant information set . 
 
The second viewpoint, and the one we will emphasize, seeks to elucidate the precise 
contents of , rather than its exploitation by investors. While keeping the fundamental 
value perspective – the idea that investors are primarily interested in the firm’s ability to 
deliver future performance – consideration should be given to the possibility that the 
individual contributions of each resource cannot be clearly identified (problems occur at 
the level of equation 2), or that some resources may not be traded in a competitive, 
liquid market (problems occur at the level of equation 3). In these cases, the relevant 
information set should encompass items of information that are not encapsulated or 
subsumed into a market price. For instance, the firm’s ability to provide a particular 
form of training for its workforce may be a relevant driver of performance potential, but 
there is no available reference market pricing for it. Accordingly, investors should 
generally rely upon an available set of information that is partly endogenously generated 
by market pricing (market-driven) and partly generated by other sources of information, 
external to the market, which are specific to the firm. Then the whole set of relevant 
                                                 
6
 Moreover, when models of asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs are used, then the identity of market 
price and fundamental value is no longer guaranteed (Stout 2003). 
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(decision-useful) information  results from and comprises two main subsets of 
information: 
 = ( ph ; yk ), h = 1, …, l and k = 1,… , m  (4) 
where ph is the subset of market-driven information and yk is the subset of non-market, 
firm-specific information.  
 
 
2. The case of intangible resources 
 
So-called intangible resources are a typical example of resources that do not usually 
meet the criteria of marketability, while being important drivers of performance for 
contemporary business firms. Intangibles are non-physical (they are not embodied in a 
physical medium) and non-financial (they do not provide any legally-enclosed revenue) 
and provide future benefits (Kim 2007). Generally speaking, the following expenditures 
are associated with the development and maintenance of such intangibles: (i) spending 
on information and communication technologies (hardware, telecommunication 
infrastructure and software); (ii) spending on research and development (R&D, both 
scientific and non-scientific) and patents; (iii) spending on the development and 
maintenance of brands and trademarks; (iv) spending on workforce training in firm-
specific capabilities and improvements in labor organization (total quality management, 
job rotation, just-in-time, team working and so on). 
 
The evidence strongly suggests that intangible resources are a crucial component of 
long-term performance or profit (Villalonga 2004). At the macro level, measurements 
using US data lead to the conclusion that, at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 
the 2000s, private investment in intangibles roughly equaled investment in tangibles, 
representing around 10% of domestic output (Nakamura 2003; Corrado, Hulten and 
Sichel 2006). Corrado et al (2006) find that, for the period 1995-2003, intangibles 
accounted for 27% of annual growth, a percentage equal to tangibles for the same 
period. At the micro level, countless studies have examined the role in firm performance 
played by R&D (Griliches 1994), new technologies (Black and Lynch 2001) or 
innovative organizational practices (Caroli and Van Reenen 2001). 
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Overall, complementarities are shown to be pervasive in a business model driven by 
intangibles (see e.g. Antonelli 2001; OECD 2006). Complementarities occur when 
combining two different resources yields greater output than using them separately. 
When resource prices are held constant, this combination symmetrically reduces total 
costs. Empirical studies stress the joint contribution provided by intangibles relating to 
workforce training, R&D and organizational innovation. With regard to information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) and new work practices, for example, Breshnahan, 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) observe that ICTs have a stronger impact on productivity 
in firms that simultaneously adopt decentralized forms of labor organization. As far as 
training and new work practices are concerned, various studies provide evidence of a 
correlation between training efforts and labor reorganization, suggesting that such a 
combination does indeed improve performance (see e.g. Lynch and Black 1998). 
Finally, Scicchitano (2007) provides evidence of complementarities between R&D and 
on-the-job training. 
 
 Because of such complementarities, intangibles do not fit the particular framework 
assumed by equations 2 and 3 regarding the separability and marketability of individual 
contributions (see also Ijiri 1967, p.58; Lev 2001). Accordingly, proper information on 
intangible resources is not generally accessible through markets but belongs rather to 
the subset of firm-specific information. 
 
To sum up, in a world of complete (meaning one market per resource) and perfect (in 
the sense of fundamentally efficient) markets, the information set would be reduced to a 
list of market prices. In this case, the certification provided by the Board merely 
consists in assessing the firm’s collection of resources in line with external market 
prices. However, if these restrictive assumptions are relaxed, entity-specific information 
is required by outside stakeholders. Yet the firm-specific subset  raises challenging 
questions. Market prices are public, objective information, easily accessible once 
generated by the market. In addition, interpretation of them is unambiguous: everyone 
agrees that a resource whose price goes from 6$ up to 12$ costs exactly twice as much 
as previously. In contrast, the statement that the quality of workforce training was 
substantially improved may be interpreted in different ways by different actors. 
Furthermore, the meaning and reliability of this statement also depends on the 
characteristics of the agent making the claim. The difference between the two subsets ph 
and yk is nicely captured by the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ information, as 
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proposed by Stein (2002) or Petersen (2004)7. Accordingly, the quality of firm-specific 
information depends critically on the context in which it is discovered and disclosed, 
and the certifiers of this information are a critical part of the process of disclosure. Thus 
the likelihood of firm-specific information being biased or incomplete cannot be 
regarded as negligible: even if the (stock) market is efficient, the available information 
set may not be fully relevant to investors. They may make the most efficient use of the 
information set that is available, but this set may be too narrow or biased to provide a 
suitable basis for assessing the firm’s ability to deliver performance over the long run. 
 
For these reasons, firm-specific information is typically provided by the accounting 
system in accordance with the enforced conventions, standards and rules on which the 
disclosure and reporting processes are based. From this point of view, the accounting 
system constitutes one of the cognitive prerequisites that enable investors to effectively 
play the stock exchange over time, leveling the market playing field by providing 
common knowledge on the business entity’s performance and position over time 
(Shubik 1993; Sunder 2002). 
                                                 
7
 According to Petersen (2004. p. 7), ‘for the information to be hard, the meaning is dependent only upon 
the information which is sent. […] With soft information the context under which it is collected and the 
collector of the information are part of the information. It is not possible to separate the two’. 
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III. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION: THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTING 
 
This section analyses the special role played by accounting in the disclosure of 
information (1.) and then examines the specific case of intangibles (2.). 
 
1. Market basis versus entity-specific basis for accounting 
 
Interestingly, the previous distinction between the two subsets making up the 
information vector  is mirrored in accounting, in which there are two main models or 
bases: a ‘market basis’ and an ‘entity-specific basis’ (Anthony 2004, p.25 and f.; IASB 
2005)8. These models differ primarily in the methods used to represent business 
resources in financial statements. 
 
Accounting for a resource on a ‘market basis’ involves measuring it at its exchange 
price under competitive market conditions, reflecting the market’s expectations as to the 
amounts, timing and uncertainty of future cash flows discounted at market rates of 
return for commensurate risk. The market price is considered as the resultant of the 
whole set of future cash flows imputable to the resource j: 

∞
=
−+
+
−
=
1
,,
)1(t t
e
tj
e
tj
j i
rrp
  (5) 
where +rej,t is the (expected) inflow at time t, -rej,t is the (expected) outflow at time t, both 
flows being imputable to the resource j having a market price pj, with i the discount rate 
of reference. 
 
The market basis for accounting therefore applies a ‘stock method’ (measurement on the 
basis of a discounted prevision of a stock of wealth). Known also as ‘fair value’ or 
‘marked-to-market’ accounting, this stock method may be performed in two different 
ways. In the first, it is assumed that the measurement has been (efficiently) performed 
by a market; in this case, the market price is used as a direct measure of the value, 
keeping accounting items in line with external market reference prices. Alternatively, 
the measurement is internally generated through accounting models, on the ground that 
                                                 
8
 This article uses ‘firm-specific’ and ‘entity-specific’ as equivalent expressions. 
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no efficient pricing is directly accessible but may be mimicked by relying on certain 
assumptions concerning future cash flows and proper discount rates9.  
 
In contrast, the method of accounting for a resource on an ‘entity-specific basis’ makes 
use of expectations and data from the reporting entity. When representing a resource, 
the entity-specific method applies a ‘flow method’ that recognizes past and current costs 
(rather than future net revenue) using conventions on the continued usefulness of the 
underlying resource for the enduring economy of the firm. So called “historical cost” 
accounting is a typical example of this measurement basis, where resources are 
accounted for through the flow of monetary expenditures (-rh) related to that resource or 
activity: 

=
−
=
n
h
hjj rC
1
,   (6) 
where C is the cumulated amount of expenditures -r that have been disbursed to period 
),...,1( nh ⊂  to develop and maintain the resource j. Contrary to the stock method, no 
legal or physical medium is required, since the resource does not have to be marketable. 
Only the existence of imputable expenditures and appropriate conventions of continuity 
and usefulness apply. 
 
Entity-specific basis is not limited to the measurement of resource through so-called 
‘historical’ cost accounting, but also encompasses the broad set of qualitative 
statements, like narratives and classifications, that seek to provide firm-specific 
information and/or forward-looking information. This type of firm-specific, less 
quantitative information has grown rapidly over recent decades. In the case of US-listed 
companies, Gordon (2007) documents a large increase in the quantity of firm-specific 
information delivered, in particular, through Form 10-K, from about 75 pages in 1985 to 
166 in 2004. Of particular interest is the growth of the ‘Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis’ (MD&A), that should, according to the SEC (Securities Act Rel. no. 6711, 
April 1987) ‘focus specifically on material events and uncertainties known to 
management that would cause reported financial information not to be necessarily 
indicative of future operating results or of future financial conditions’. According to 
                                                 
9
 The reliance of marked to model on specific information and data that the market is by definition unable 
to validate, raises doubts as to whether this measurement technique really belongs to the market basis, 
rather than to the entity-specific basis. 
 14
Gordon (2007), the average MD&A expanded from about 5 pages in 1985 to 24 in 
2004. In France, entity-specific basis of accounting is provided for by the Rapport de 
gestion (‘Business report’, Code de commerce article L.225-102-1), and the 
complementary disclosure on corporate social responsibility established by the New 
Economic Regulation (NER) Act of May 2001 (Law 2001-420). This set of reports 
delivers forward-looking information (through a document on the general situation of 
the company and its expected evolution) as well as a document detailing how the social 
and environmental consequences of corporate activity are dealt with. Needless to say, 
this information is firm-specific, soft in nature and lacking in adequate market reference 
pricing. 
 
To conclude, by referring to expenditures incurred by the firm or to qualitative 
information specific to it, the entity-specific basis of accounting clearly refers to the 
firm-specific subset of the  vector, while the marked-to-market basis of accounting 
refers to the market subset.  
 
2. Accounting for intangibles 
 
The regulatory treatment of intangible resources offers a conspicuous example of the 
consequences of these two accounting bases. A first possibility is to favor a market 
basis for the measurement of these resources: the international accounting standard for 
intangible assets (IAS 38, §39) adopts this solution, linking informational reliability to 
market-based estimates of value. Therefore, this accounting standard denies asset 
recognition and measurement to a number of expenditures related to resources that lack 
a proper market basis, such as ‘research activities aimed at obtaining new knowledge; 
search for, evaluation and final selection of, applications of research findings or other 
knowledge; search for alternatives for materials, devices, products, processes, systems 
or services; and the formulation, design, evaluation and final selection of possible 
alternatives for new or improved materials, devices, products, processes, systems or 
services’ (IAS 38, §56). Generally speaking, internally generated intangibles, such as 
core research activities, are not capitalized as assets, even though ‘entity’s costing 
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systems can often measure reliably the cost of generating an intangible asset internally, 
such as salary and other expenditure incurred’ (IAS 38, §62).10 
 
Thus whenever intangible assets are important drivers for future performance, the 
regulatory decision to confine the accounting reporting to market-basis methods is 
likely to lead to investment decisions based on an incomplete set of information11. Thus, 
the importance of intangibles should pave the way to consider other, entity-specific 
accounting methods. A pure historical cost accounting system that capitalizes and 
amortizes the expenditures (including deferred charges) linked to internally generated 
intangibles as depreciable assets is a convenient way to effect this measurement. 
Evidence of this treatment existed in European accounting systems and regulations 
before the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (see e.g. in the 
French case: Plan Comptable Général, articles 361-1, 361-2 and 361-3) as well as in the 
current Japanese accounting standards on R&D Cost and Intangible Assets. 
 
Furthermore, this entity-specific accounting representation is not limited to financial 
figures (quantitative information), but may also include classifications and narrative 
explanations (qualitative information) disclosed according to accepted principles of 
informational veracity. An interesting case of such a system as applied to intangibles is 
provided by the French regulation on social reporting (‘bilan social’), which requires 
large companies to establish a conventionally standardized set of non-financial 
measures on workforce-related issues such as remuneration, training, and security at 
work (Law 77-769, July 1977). This set is not publicly disclosed, but is available to all 
employees and their representatives. Another example is the voluntary disclosure 
devoted to environmental and social responsibility issues that is increasingly provided 
                                                 
10
 Other examples are provided by IAS 38 – Intangible Assets, §6, 1998 version and IAS38 – Intangible 
Assets, §63-64. On this point, see Eckstein (2004). 
11
 This point is fully acknowledged by the OECD (2006, p.7), which notes: ‘traditional accounting has 
necessarily remained focused on tangible assets. Traditionally, the only intangible assets recognized in 
financial statements have been intellectual property, such as patents and trademarks where a market 
value has been established by a transaction, and acquired items such as goodwill. Although accounting 
standards can probably be developed further to take into account a wider range of intangibles, clear 
limits are set by the difficulty of establishing monetary values (valuation) that are at the same time 
consistent across firms, verifiable and that cannot be easily manipulated. As a result, a significant portion 
of corporate assets go under-reported in the financial accounts. The relative lack of accounting 
recognition of intangibles coupled with their growing importance in the value creation process means 
that the financial statements have lost some of their value for shareholders. If other information does not 
fill the void, there could be misallocation of resources in capital markets’. See also Blair and Wallman 
(2001). 
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by companies worldwide and sometimes audited by specialized consulting firms 
(KPMG, 2008). 
 
In conclusion, improved entity-specific methods appear to be best suited to recognizing 
and accounting for intangibles resources while still fulfilling the principal objectives of 
auditing and enforcing public information disclosure. Intangibles may then be 
recognized and accounted for through the capitalization of bundles of imputable 
monetary outflows (expenditures), supplementary systems of non-monetary 
measurements and trustworthy disclosure of narrative information. This inside-related 
information may require a special control environment if it is to be disclosed and 
audited in a reliable and consistent way. In particular, and this is the crucial point we 
shall discuss in the following section, the certification of such information disclosure 
necessarily requires some firm-specific expertise on the part of directors. 
 
IV. BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND FIRM-SPECIFIC EXPERTISE: 
THE TRADE-OFF 
 
 Under the ‘decision usefulness paradigm’, the performance of the accounting process 
should be evaluated according to the degree of correspondence between required and 
disclosed information. This performance is a function of the system of disclosure, which 
includes the accounting standards and the actors having ultimate responsibility for 
certifying the financial statements. Accordingly, company directors have a crucial role 
to play in enhancing the overall quality of financial and non-financial reporting (Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy and Wright 2004). In turn, this may improve the accuracy of financial 
decision-making by investors and shareholders. 
 
As part of its monitoring role, including the validation of financial and non-financial 
reporting, an essential attribute for a Board is the propensity of its members not to 
collude with corporate executives – that is to be ‘objective’ (Boot and Macey 2004). Of 
course, objectivity is ultimately a subjective disposition. However, distant shareholders 
and other external stakeholders, as well as regulators, need to be able to rely on clear-
cut proxies. Accordingly, the basic idea common to a number of existing definitions of 
independence is to identify some objective criteria that minimize the conflict of interests 
between directors and corporate officers. Generally speaking, independence is assumed 
to be compromised if the director of a company (i) is, or has been, a corporate executive 
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of that company or of its affiliates, (ii) is, or has been, employed by that company or by 
its affiliates, (iii) is employed as an executive of another company where any of that 
company’s executives sit on the Board, (iv) is a large block-holder of that company or 
(v) has a significant business relationship with that company or its affiliates. On this 
basis, directors are usually divided into three groups according to their relative degree of 
independence (Clarke 2007). Executive or inside directors are corporate executives. 
Affiliated or gray directors are not executives, but they do not meet one of the previous 
criteria; this category encompasses in particular employees, long-term block-holders or 
investment bankers in relation with the company. Finally, independent directors are 
outsiders that fulfil the whole set of criteria. 
 
As a general proposition, de jure independence is supposed to foster ‘objectivity’, 
which in turn increases the probability of sanctions being imposed on imprudent or 
underperforming managers. Following this approach, Ferreira, Ferreira and Raposo 
(2008) define independence as the probability of a CEO being fired and replaced by the 
Board, once he or she has been judged by the stock market (or the Board itself) to be 
performing poorly. As far as certification is concerned, such a definition of 
independence ensures that directors will reject information they believe to be biased or 
incomplete and will make sure that appropriate market values have been used to 
evaluate corporate assets (Gordon 2007).  
 
However, independence (even augmented with generic literacy in accounting and 
finance) can be the sole attribute determining the quality of disclosure when the 
information set to be certified comprises only market-driven information. As argued 
above (1.1), a not insignificant part of the relevant information set needed by investors 
is firm-specific (yk) and the quality of this soft information is intrinsically related to the 
characteristics of the actors that produce and certify it. Put differently, accounting 
figures are not, most of the time, subject to validation through market evidence. This is 
especially true for narrative information dealing with intangibles (see 2.2 above), as 
well as for ‘forward-looking’ information intended to identify factors that may influence 
a firm’s future performance and position. However, it is also true for pure historical cost 
accounting:  the appropriate identification, classification and imputation of expenditures 
to related intangible resources requires a specific knowledge of the context and 
processes that have been put in place inside the firm to develop and maintain these 
resources. 
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Whenever firm-specific information is disclosed, the economic usefulness of the 
certification by the Board depends on the ability of its members to actually understand 
the main features of the business model. And this cognitive aptitude is less related to a 
generic expertise in accounting and finance than to specific knowledge of that business 
over time (Lanfranconi and Robertson 2002). When directors do not have any particular 
firm-specific expertise, then their certification becomes purely formal, acquiring 
economic significance only as such expertise is developed.  
 
Thus trustworthy certification requires both a willingness to refuse accreditation of 
biased or narrow reports and the ability to gather and assess firm-specific information. 
As a consequence, the overall quality of control over information disclosure increases 
the more independent directors are and the more firm-specific expertise they have.Yet, 
while there is no reason to posit that generic expertise is negatively linked to de jure 
independence, things are different for firm-specific expertise. As the previous definition 
makes clear, application of the standard criteria used to define independence in practice 
result in putting a distance between the firm and its directors so as to minimize potential 
conflict of interests with executive management. In turn, this distance tends to reduce 
the directors’ ability to acquire and assess firm-specific knowledge. By contrast, being 
part of the firm (as executives and non-executive employees are) or being in close 
connection with it (as investment bankers, large block-holders and representatives of 
main stakeholders are) provides some noticeable advantages in dealing with firm-
specific information. It is widely recognized that independent (outside) directors are at a 
cognitive disadvantage over non-independent (insider) directors (see e.g. Baysinger and 
Hoskisson 1990, p.74; Klein 1998, p. 278; Osterloh and Frey 2006). This disadvantage 
may, in some circumstances, undermine the overall monitoring performance of a purely 
independent Board. For instance, appointing an independent director (an academic 
lawyer in corporate governance, for example) to the Board of a listed bio-technology 
firm is like appointing an economist to the panel examining a doctoral thesis on 
theological aesthetics. While the economist will surely be objective (i.e. impartial in 
disputes between scholars of theological aesthetics), one may seriously doubt his or her 
ability properly to assess the candidate’s overall quality. 
 
Another way to express the argument is to distinguish between de jure (formal) 
independence and genuine (substantive) independence. Because of the cognitive 
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disadvantage they have over insiders, de jure independent directors have to rely on the 
information provided by the firm’s executive management to fulfil their monitoring role 
(McNulty and Pettygrew 1999). This reliance actually limits directors’ real 
independence, i.e. the ability to monitor objectively. By contrast, firm-specific 
expertise, in the sense of a deeper business understanding, may increase real 
independence (Hooghiemstra and van Manen 2004; Wagner 2008). 
 
To sum up, independence offers decisive advantages in terms of control, but it also has 
an opportunity cost in that it reduces a Board’s ability to cope with entity-specific 
information. Accordingly, it can reasonably assumed that there is a fundamental trade-
off between de jure independence and firm-specific expertise that will determine an 
optimal level of independence12.  
 
The following economic model aims to capture the basic functioning of this trade-off. 
For simplicity’s sake, let us assume that each Board member is either a firm-specific 
expert (defined as e) or independent (defined as i). Normalizing the size of the Board to 
one, we have: 
i = 1 – e ∈ (0 ;1) 
where i is the relative share of independent Board members. 
 
Furthermore, let us assume that the firm is characterised by a given relative presence of 
intangible resources that do not have a market basis for accounting and disclosure. This 
degree k is normalised to one. Moreover, let us assume that k  e. This simply implies 
that the Board’s knowledge or expertise is never complete.  
 
In this framework, the total agency cost related to the Board acting as certifier may be 
defined as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )keMkeCkiDeiWkeiB ,,,,  ,, +++≡  (7) 
                                                 
12
 Ferreira et al (2008) propose a model in which shareholders optimize on the level of independence. 
They also argue that the main advantage of independence is to make sure that a ‘bad’ CEO will be fired. 
However, the tradeoff they propose is different from ours: in their model, independence has a monetary 
cost that is borne by shareholders (due to dispersed ownership in particular). In our model, the cost of 
independence is non-monetary: it is the reduced ability of directors to acquire and certify firm-specific 
information. A further difference might be pinpointed: while the Board’s ability to identify a bad CEO is 
exogenous in their model, our analysis suggests that this ability is endogenous. In particular, it decreases 
as de jure independence increases. 
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Or, equivalently, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )kiMkiCkiDiiWkiB ,1,1,1,  , −+−++−≡   (7’) 
 
In particular: 
 
• W(i,e) is the fixed cost of the Board incurred as a result of the remunerations 
(wi , we) paid to its members (i , e). Its derivative is increasing (or null) in i when the 
independent member remuneration is higher than the expert member remuneration 
(W’I  0 if wi  we), and decreasing in i otherwise (W’i < 0 if wi < we). Analytically, a 
generic function denotes this cost as follows: 
( ) ewiwiiW ei ⋅+⋅=−1,  (8) 
where W’i , W’e  > 0. 
 
• D(i,k) is the ignorance cost of the Board relative to its level of independence. It 
arises because independent members lack the ability to discover, understand and certify 
relevant non-market, entity-specific information (k). According to the previous 
discussion, the higher the level of k for a given level of i, the lower the Board’s ability 
to understand and monitor management behaviour (analytically, the derivative is then 
increasing in k: D’k  > 0); and the higher the Board’s level of independence (i), the less 
able it is to understand a given k (analytically, the derivative is increasing in i: D’i  > 0). 
Furthermore, let us assume: D(i,0) = 0 (i.e. if there is no entity-specific information, 
then no ignorance cost will arise for any i); and D(0,k) = 0  (i.e. if the Board comprises 
only experts, then, by definition, no ignorance cost will arise for any k). Analytically, 
this cost may be described as follows: 
( ) kidkiD ⋅⋅=,   (9) 
where d > 0 and D’i , D’k  > 0. 
 
• C(e,k) is the Board’s perking (collusion) cost relative to its level of entity-
specific expertise. It arises because the need for specific expertise makes it necessary to 
appoint insiders to the Board whose position obviously makes it easier for them than for 
independent members to collude with management. It is possible to rewrite this function 
as C(1-i,k). Its derivative is decreasing in i: C’i < 0 (i.e. the higher i is, the lower the 
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perking cost is), and increasing in k: C’k  > 0 (i.e. the higher k is, the greater the 
opportunity to collude becomes). Furthermore, let us assume: C(e,0) = 0 (i.e. if there are 
no entity-specific information, then no perking costs arise for any e: there is no specific 
information to be hidden); and C(0,k) = 0  (i.e. if the Board comprises only independent 
members, then, by definition, no perking cost arises for any k). Analytically, this cost 
may be described as follows: 
( ) keckeC ⋅⋅=,   (10) 
where c > 0 and C’e , C’k  > 0. 
 
• M(e,k) is the Board’s supplemental monitoring cost relative to its independence. 
It arises because independent directors may need to hire professional consultants and 
auditors to assist them; the cost of hiring external experts therefore constitutes the 
opportunity cost of maintaining a higher level of independence. According to the 
previous discussion, the higher the value of k, the greater the accumulated cost of these 
external advisors required to cope with k (analytically, the derivative respect to k is 
positive: M’k>0). Furthermore, the higher the share of experts on the Board (e), the 
lower the monitoring cost becomes (i.e. the derivative respect e is negative: M’e < 0). 
Finally, when e = k, then M(k,k) = 0: when e reaches the maximum value, then there is 
no need to hire professional consultants and the opportunity cost is zero. Analytically, 
this cost is described as follows:  
( ) ( )221, ekmkeM −⋅⋅=  (11) 
where m > 0 and M’k > 0 , M’e < 0, with k  e. 
 
Accordingly, the total agency cost of the Board may be denoted as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )221 1,, ikmkckicdwiwwkeiB eei +−⋅⋅+⋅+⋅⋅−++⋅−=  (12) 
 
Efficiency requires this total cost B(i,e,k) to be minimized for each level of entity-
specific information (k). Figure 1 comprises two graphs: graph 1 denotes the cost curve 
for each level of k; graph 2 denotes the corresponding locus of optimal values for 
(i*,k*).13 
                                                 
13
 This graph describes a simulation of the model when wi = we=1, m=4, d=2, c=3. Different parameter 
values will not alter the main results. 
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*** Insert Figure 1 here *** 
 
In graph (1), the y-axis represents the total cost B(i,k) and the x-axis the level of  
independence of the Board (i). Each curve identifies the value of B(i,k=given) and 
shows how such cost changes for each level of i when k is given. When k increases, the 
cost function B(i,k) is identified by escalating curves.  
 
For a given level of entity-specific information (k), it is possible to identify an optimal 
level of Board independence that minimizes the cost function B(i,k). Since higher k 
implies descending cost curves, then the optimal level of i, given by B’i(i,k*)=0, is a 
decreasing function of k. This decreasing function identifies the trade-off between 
entity-specific information (k) and Board independence (i). Solving the minimization of 
the cost function B(i,e,k) for each value of k, we obtain the i-k trade-off function: 
( ) ( )
m
kmcdww
i ei
+−+−
−= 1   (13) 
 
This means that the higher the entity-specific information (k) is, the lower the optimal 
level of Board independence (i) becomes. Our analysis then predicts that the optimal 
proportion of (de jure) independent Board members decreases as the importance of 
intangible resources in corporate performance increases. This relation between k and i 
depends on the parameters. In particular, the optimal level of independent directors is 
lower when:  
- wi is higher then we ; 
- d
 
is higher than c (i.e. the ignorance cost is higher than the perking cost); 
- m
 
is higher (i.e. higher cost to hire external experts). 
 
Graph (2) shows the i-k trade-off function. When the level of intangible resources (k) is 
zero, the optimal level of Board independence (i) is one: all members of the Board 
should be independent. Furthermore, i = 1 implies e = 0 and no perking cost arises. 
Finally, k = 0 implies that there is no specific information to discover: the ignorance 
cost is zero. When k increases, for example when the management of the firm develops 
innovative practices, products or technologies, the relevant level of entity-specific 
information increases and a fully independent Board (i=1) is no longer able to discover 
and properly certify the new ‘information set’ alone. A trade-off between i and k arises. 
If the composition of the Board does not change, the agency cost will increase because k 
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is higher. On the one hand, the ignorance cost increases (D’k>0); on the other hand, the 
independent Board has to hire professional experts to compensate for its ignorance 
regarding entity-specific information k (M’i = - M’e > 0). The more k increases, the 
higher the cost of maintaining a fully independent Board. At some point k0 (depending 
on parameters), a fully independent Board becomes inefficient: for each k > k0, cost 
minimization requires that some independent Board members should be replaced by 
expert members. This new Board composition leads to lower monitoring costs (since 
expert members have a better understanding of the entity-specific information), even 
though this increases the likelihood of additional perking costs (which increase in e: 
C’e > 0). 
 
Generally speaking, the trade-off implies an optimal Board composition with a mix of 
expert and independent members. The precise optimal share depends on the changing 
characteristics of the industry and the business (captured by parameters). Beyond a 
certain level of independence, further increases may undermine the Board’s overall 
ability to exercise effective control over the firm. Thus excessive independence may 
have adverse consequences and ultimately damage the firm’s performance.  
 
By contrast, non-independent grey or affiliated directors, whose position involves firm-
specific expertise, have some attractive attributes that serve to enhance the efficiency of 
corporate control and the overall quality of corporate disclosure. This is particularly the 
case with (non-executive) employee representatives (on this point, see also Osterloh and 
Frey 2006). On the one hand, they have long-term relationships with the firm – a 
convenient way to develop firm-specific expertise – while their interests remain a priori 
distinct from those of the executive managerial team. On the other hand, workforce 
training in firm-specific capabilities and labor organization are two of the main 
components of intangible performance drivers: Corrado et al (2006) estimate in the US 
case for the period 1995-2003 that investments aimed at enhancing human resources 
(training, labor organization including strategic planning) accounted for one third of 
total investment in intangible assets. Furthermore, while they observe that, for the same 
period, investments in intangibles accounted for 27% of the annual growth, they note 
that the contribution of training and organizational innovation amounts to one third of 
this 27%. Thus the inclusion of employee representatives on the Board may enhance its 
ability to cope with firm-specific information and intangibles, especially those related to 
human capital. This analysis is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by 
Fauver and Fuerst (2006), who show that the inclusion of worker representatives on the 
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(supervisory) Boards of German firms is positively correlated (up to a certain point) 
with the performance of those firms.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has dealt with the quality of financial reporting as a crucial component of 
efficient corporate control and share market pricing. The investigation has focused on 
the role of the Board of directors. We have shown that firm-specific expertise may be an 
important attribute for directors when the relevant information set for investors and 
shareholders includes so-called ‘firm-specific’ information. This is particularly true 
whenever intangibles are significant drivers of performance, such as in high-tech and 
innovative industries. Yet we argue that there is a trade-off between this kind of 
expertise and the de jure independence that is commonly advocated by institutional 
investors and policy-makers. Consequently, more (de jure) independence is not always 
desirable: there is an optimal share of independent Board members that decreases as the 
importance of intangible resources increases. In sum, our analysis points to the 
attractiveness of pluralistic Board appointments involving (de jure) independent 
members, affiliated members and stakeholder representatives with specific knowledge 
of the business. Conversely, our analysis cautions against ‘super’ or ‘full majority’ 
Boards, except when business performance depends solely on a simple set of separable 
tangible resources. 
 
In terms of future researches, our analysis points toward two directions. Regarding 
corporate governance per se, and more precisely the Board, empirical analysis relating 
board composition to the specific attributes of firms (in particular importance and type 
of intangible assets) is needed. And while (de jure) independence is an important 
parameter of board composition, our analysis calls for further investigation on the 
cognitive aptitude of directors, through identification of proxies (education, other 
mandates, prior and current job experience, etc.) for firm-specific and generic expertise 
(see in this direction Masulis and Mobbs, 2009). Regarding accounting theory and 
practice, our analysis demonstrates that the growing importance of intangible resources 
should lead to a careful (re)consideration of non-market basis for accounting, such as 
improvement on historical cost accounting systems. In any case, this re(consideration) 
should be strongly grounded in the economic theory (of the firm), as recognised by 
Coase (1990). 
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Figure 1 – The Board cost and the trade-off between independence and firm-
specific expertise 
 
B(i,k)
1
k= ko = 0
k1> ko
i= io = 1i1< ioi2< i1
k2< k1
km= 1
im< i2
k
1k= ko = 0
k1> ko
i= io = 1i1< ioi2< i1
k2< k1
km= 1
im< i2
Board Cost
i-k trade off
